Policy making as bricolage: the role of platforms in institutional innovation by Cartel, Mélodie et al.
Policy making as bricolage: the role of platforms in
institutional innovation
Me´lodie Cartel, Eva Boxenbaum, Franck Aggeri
To cite this version:
Me´lodie Cartel, Eva Boxenbaum, Franck Aggeri. Policy making as bricolage: the role of plat-
forms in institutional innovation. EGOS, Jul 2014, Rotterdam, Netherlands. 2014. <hal-
01089462>
HAL Id: hal-01089462
https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01089462
Submitted on 1 Dec 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1 
 
Policy making as bricolage: the role of platforms in 
institutional innovation 
 
EGOS Conference, Rotterdam, 3-5 July 2014 
 
Mélodie Cartel, 
Eva Boxenbaum 
& Franck Aggeri 
CGS 
MINES ParisTech 
Abstract 
The making of environmental policies is a multi-stakeholders process where actors often hold 
antagonistic interests. The paper explores how institutional compromises are reached by the 
mechanism of collective bricolage. Recent studies are developing a view on institutional 
innovation as bricolage, but the conditions under which bricolage occurs and succeeds in 
relation to institutional innovation are still unknown. Drawing on the notion of platform 
developed in the context of economics performativity, we study their role in bricolage 
mechanisms. We hold an empirical case study of the GETS platform that was instrumental in 
developing the European carbon market as a corner-stone of European climate policy. Based 
on the GETS case study, we find three modalities in which platforms stimulate institutional 
bricolage: catalyzing combinations, managing learning, fostering compromise. These findings 
draw on, and extend, the notion of platforms developed in the context of economics 
performativity, contributing to a better understanding of processes of bricolage and, more 
widely, of institutional innovation. The managerial implication of this study is to identify the 
conditions under which compromises become manageable in processes of policy making.    
2 
 
Keywords: Institutional bricolage, innovation, platforms 
Introduction 
According to recent work, endogenous processes of institutional innovation are 
underpinned by continuous re-combinations of resources at hand in the institutional context 
(Carstensen, 2011; Garud and Karnøe, 2003; Højgaard Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013; 
Leca and Naccache, 2006). Such processes have been labeled bricolage, a concept that makes 
reference to the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1962; 1966) who introduced the notion 
in social sciences. Institutional scholars have since then used the concept of bricolage rather 
descriptively to explain compromises in institutionalization processes (Glynn, 2008; Højgaard 
Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013). They all conceptualize bricolageas a process that unfolds 
“naturally”, offering little insight into the causes, mechanisms, and conditions that are 
characteristic of bricolage. Our objective is to begin to unpack the black box of bricolage by 
identifying the conditions under which bricolage is stimulated, or even deliberately provoked. 
A better understanding of the conditions for bricolage can enhance the conceptualization of 
processes of institutionalinnovation. It also has managerial implications to the extent that it 
highlights conditions of successful bricolage.  
Our orientation builds on the notion of platforms that Muniesa and Callon (2007) 
developed in the context of economic performativity. The research stream on economic 
performativity identifies “experimental moments” during which economic models are 
incarnated into material arrangements and subsequently assessed. In an attempt to 
conceptualize these experimental moments, Muniesa and Callon (2007) distinguish between 
three ideal typical experimental configurations: laboratories, in vivo experimentations and 
platforms. One of them, the platform configuration, is particularly favorable to “surprises” 
and bricolage because of its openness and flexibility (Ciborra, 1996; Muniesa and Callon, 
2007). Muniesa and Callon’s work of platforms provided an interesting framework to further 
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analyze the conditions under which bricolage occur. We extend their work into the realm of 
institutional innovation.  
Drawing on an empirical case study, we explore the role of the GETS platform, a particular 
platform that was used in 2003 to develop the European carbon market. This platform was 
originally launched in 1998 by the European electricity sector, which used it to host 
interactions among multiple stakeholders of carbon markets and to develop a prototype for 
carbon markets. Using the GETS platform, the electricity sector invited members of the 
industry and the European Commission to engage in collective bricolage on carbon market 
prototypes. Different prototypes were crafted, experimented with, and evaluated, finally 
producing a prototype that fitted the requirements of every stakeholder. We use the GETS 
case study to identify the conditions that favor bricolage inside platforms.  
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we contribute to a better understanding of 
institutional innovation in neo-institutional theory by conceptualizing the role of platforms 
and bricolage in innovation processes. We find that platforms stimulate bricolage in three 
ways: catalyzing combinations, managing learning, fostering compromise. Catalyzing refers 
to the stimulation of recombining activities. Managing learning refers to the experimental 
conditions that enabled to learn on the desirable designs of carbon markets. Fostering 
compromise refers to the collective agreement on a collective evaluation framework. Second, 
we clarify the status of bricolage in innovation processes and thus contribute to the literatures 
on bricolage and innovation management. Third, we provide empirical evidence for Muniesa 
and Callon’s (2007) framework of economic performativity through our empirical description 
of the platform configuration and simultaneously extend their work to the institutional realm. 
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Theoretical Context 
An original understanding of institutional innovation is currently being developed in the 
context of neo-institutional theory. Recent studies have built on the notion of bricolage to 
describe endogenous processes of innovation (Carstensen, 2011). Nevertheless, all these 
studies evoke the notion of bricolage as an ex post explanation of innovation. They do not 
target for analysis the process of bricolage, but simply present it as a naturally occurring 
phenomenon that is well suited to describe innovation mechanisms. The conditions under 
which bricolage occurs, and how it relates to institutional innovation,are left aside, which 
restricts the analytical potential to superficial analysis and masks the relational and cognitive 
dynamics of institutional innovation.  
As for the role of platforms in institutional innovation, a few authors have proposed that 
protected spaces might play an important role in processes of institutional innovation 
(Guérard and Siedl, 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010).These studies emphasize the impact 
of the lociin institutional processes. Nevertheless, they barely offer any insight into conditions 
that these spacesprovide to stimulate bricolage. We extend this line of inquiry by further 
exploring platforms as a particular condition for bricolage and hence for institutional 
innovation. We build on Muniesa and Callon’s (2007) work on performation spaces to 
investigate the role of platforms in stimulating bricolage. 
Insights on institutional innovation  
Institutional innovation and bricolage 
An increasing number of studies conceptualize institutional innovation as the on-going 
recombination of resources at hand in the institutional environment (Swidler, 1986; 2000; 
2003; Leca and Naccache, 2006; Zietsma and Macknight, 2009). Bricolage produces original 
associations thaterode taken for grantedcategories and institutional boundaries (Rao, Monin 
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and Durand, 2005). The use of bricolage in neo-institutional theory depicts innovation as an 
incremental process that involves recombination of almost anything that is present in the 
institutional context: residues of an old institutional order (Zietsma and Macknight, 2009), 
cultural elements such as symbols and logics (Højgaard Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013), 
calculative tools and devices (Arjaliès, 2013; Déjeanet al., 2004), narratives and metaphors 
(Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Slageret al., 2012); and shared culture and meanings 
(Hargadon and Douglas, 2001). These studies envision the institutional context as a toolkit, 
from which designers may pick up elements at will. They agree that new institutions arise 
through continuous reshuffling of old institutional elements. More recently, neo-institutional 
scholars have used the concept of bricolage to qualify such recombining process (Boxenbaum 
and Rouleau, 2011; Cartel, 2013; Garud and Karnøe, 2003; Glynn, 2008; Højgaard 
Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013).  
Introduced by Levi-Strauss (1962; 1966), the concept of bricolage qualifies a quite 
singular way of acting that results in the production of novel arrangements. Since Levi-
Strauss’ seminal writings (Ibid.), the notion of bricolage has increasingly been mobilized 
within organizational studies to characterize innovation situations and practices (see 
Duymedjian and Rüling, 2010 for a detailed review of the concept of bricolage within the 
management and organizational studies). Four main characteristics of bricolage have taken 
shape since the concept was borrowed and adapted from the work of Lévi-Strauss. First, the 
nature of the resources used consists of often obsolete objects and residues that are not 
associated with traditional robust innovation (Baker et al., 2003). Second, the resources are 
often diverted from their original use to acquire new meanings and identities for which they 
were never intended when they were designed (Baker and Nelson, 2005; Ciborra, 1996). 
Third, the design process is rather distributed, unpredictable, complex and unplanned 
(Ciborra, 2002; Garud and Karnøe, 2003). Eventually, it seems that the project of bricolage 
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can be used to foster compromise between actors that are driven by heterogeneous, sometimes 
antagonistic, logics rather than to generate robust or original solutions to specific problems 
(Højgaard Christiansen and Lounsbury, 2013).  
The role of protected spaces in institutional innovation. 
Recently, a few studies have emphasized the importance of “location” of institutional 
creative work. The place where innovation “takes place” is not trifling. To the contrary, it 
seems to impact both organizations’ ability to innovate and the result of the innovation 
process. Guérard and Siedl(2013) have used the notion of protected spaces to refer to places 
where organizations develop divergent frameworks without risking controversy. Away from 
prying eyes, organizations are free to engage in controversial projects. Zietsma and Lawrence 
(2010) reveal the importance of experimental spaces where organizations undertake 
experiments separated from day to day activities. In experimental spaces, organizations assess 
the social acceptability, i.e., the potential legitimacy, of new ideas or concepts. This paper 
explores whether secret experimentations offer a favorable condition for bricolage. If so, 
secret experimental spaces may be a key for success in institutional innovation initiatives. 
Typically, such secret experimentations are hosted inside platforms, so to say places that 
gather multiple stakeholders toward an experimental prototype.  
Integrating platforms into the equation 
Muniesa and Callon (2007) conceptualize different experimental configurations where 
economic experiments take place. Such experimentations have been found to be instrumental 
in institution building, so to say, the making of institutions that are supposed to transpose 
economic theory such as carbon markets (Guala, 2005; 2007). They make it possible to test 
the conditions under which theoretical concepts are transposable into innovative institutional 
frameworks or policies (MacKenzie, 2003; 2004; 2007).  
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Research indicates that platforms are particularly favorable to bricolage processes 
(Ciborra, 1996; 2002; Muniesa and Callon, 2007). In Muniesa and Callon’s (2007) 
framework, the platform refers to a space thatis more open toward the outside than, for 
instance, the laboratory as Latour describes it (Latour, 1987; Latour and Woolgar, 1979, 
Participants – their role and nature – are likely to evolve over time, and to join the 
experimentation. A platform configuration enables new forms of interactions, in particular, 
hybridization and confrontation of different domains of knowledge, competences and 
interests. The platform configuration enables the testing of objects that are more complex and 
closer to “real economic objects” than the laboratory. Demonstration in platforms consists in 
achieving a compromise – shared understandings and expectations –among the participants 
rather than in creating robust disruptive innovation. 
We borrow the notion of platform from the work of Muniesa and Callon (2007) and 
introduce it into the analysis of institutional innovation, as a way to explore the conditions 
that stimulate and favor bricolage. Our research question unfolds as follows: What are the 
conditions platforms uniquely offer that stimulate and provoke bricolage during policy 
making.  
Method and data 
Field settings 
The European emission trading scheme (Eu-ETS) is the first and largest carbon marketin 
the world. It was enacted in 2003 and is now providing the basic framework for the 
construction of new carbon markets all over the world. The origins of this trading scheme are 
not well known. Yet, as pecific initiative has played a considerable role in the making of the 
Eu-ETS but it has been forgotten and is not part of the official story. Apart from a few experts 
and a handful of scholars (Braun, 2009; Skjaerseth and Wettestad, 2013) that barely cite it, the 
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GETS initiative remains unknown. Either it never entered collective memory or it rapidly 
faded from it once the Eu-ETS was formally established.  
Instead there is an official story that formalizes the creation of the European carbon market 
(Ellerman, Convery and De Perthuis, 2010). In this story, economic theory on cap and trade 
instruments was developed in the 1970
th
by a group of economists (Coase, 1960; Crocker, 
1966; Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972). It provided the intellectual background that drove the 
European Commission in its strong institutional entrepreneurship to implement carbon 
markets in Europe against a carbon tax (Convery, 2009; Convery and Redmond, 2007; 
Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003; Wettestad, 2005; Skjaerseth et Wettestad, 2008). 
Oddly enough, in light of this official storyline, the Eu-ETS directive is characterized by 
design heterogeneity. A close reading of the European carbon market directive suggests that it 
borrowsheterogeneous elements from three different institutional repertoires: environmental, 
economic and managerial spheres. These elements are apparently combined through 
bricolage: the document is literally invaded by managerial language (e.g., projects-based 
mechanisms; credits; monitoring and reporting system; energy-efficient technologies), 
economic locutions (e.g., cost effective functioning; banking) and environmental jargon (e.g. 
greenhouse gas concentrations; IPCC targets), which are firmly intertwined with one another.. 
Clearly, the official story that presents the directive as the product of linear transposition of 
rational economic paradigm fails to explain the bricolage aspect of the directive. This 
misalignment suggests that bricolage may have been at play in the elaboration of the 
directive, yet this feature, and the historical events and protected spaces that produced it, have 
been eliminated from the official, legitimate story of how the European carbon market 
directive came into existence. 
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Toward an enriched story of the Eu‐ETS: the forgotten role of the GETS platform. 
Few studies in social sciences have analyzed the collective inquiry on carbon markets that 
has emerged after the Kyoto Protocol. Starting around 1998, alongside the effort of the 
European Commission to design a viable carbon market, intense collective inquiry was 
organized by different European actors including companies, governments, economists and 
NGO's (Braun, 2009; Callon, 2009). Among these initiatives, the most famous are the carbon 
market prototype experimented by the energy company British Petroleum at the company 
level and the Climate Change Levy imagined by the United Kingdom at the national 
level(Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003; Ellerman and Butchner, 2007; Zapfel and Vaino, 
2002). During this "experimental moment" in the wild, alternative designs of carbon markets 
were generated and negotiated inside platforms (Callon, 2009; Wettestad, 2005).  
The GETS platform was one of them. GETS stands for Greenhouse Gas and Electricity 
Trading Simulation. The GETS initiative was launched in 1998 by the European electricity 
sector to simulate and anticipate the effects of carbon markets. The sector gathered and 
created a working group on climate change dedicated to the making andassessment of 
different prototypes of carbon markets. The working group progressively enrolled all the main 
stakeholders of the current European carbon market: the industry members cited in the 
European Commission’s green paper on emission trading, as well as representatives of the 
European Commission working group on climate change. Despite the theoretical infinity of 
designs that carbon markets could have taken, the prototype that the GETS platform members 
finally agreed on is exactly similar to the directive 2003/87/EC that was enacted by the 
European Commission two years later. Nevertheless, there are absolutely no traces in the 
scholarly literature, nor in the professional literature that restores the importance of the GETS 
platform in the making of the Eu-ETS. Building on the idea that secret spaces play a role in 
processes of institutional innovation, we began collecting data to reconstitute the GETS 
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episode and learn more about the effects of the platform in the institutionalization of the Eu-
ETS.  
Data collection 
We conducted an in-depth longitudinal case study analysis covering a 5-year period from 
the “preparatory phase” of Kyoto in 1997 to the EU-ETS implementation in 2003  (Pettigrew, 
1990). The data were collected over three years, from December 2009 to June 2012.We 
collected two bodies of data. 
Archival research. First, we collected archives of both the GETS simulation (e.g. internal 
documents such as personal mail archives, companies’ internal reports and external 
documents such as Eurelectric’s official position papers, GETS simulation reports) and the 
European Emission Trading Scheme directive (e.g. draft projects, green papers, white papers, 
the written accounts of the European Commission’s stakeholder meetings). These documents 
provided us with valuable information on (1) the bricolage activities undertaken in the GETS 
platform for the duration of the GETS experiments; (2) The co-evolution of the GETS 
experiment and its institutional context.  
Interviews. We supplemented the archival research with interviews with both the actors of 
the GETS and the main stakeholders of the making of the Eu-ETS. We were particularly 
interested in the role each actor played in the crafting, trial and the evaluation of the carbon 
market prototypes that were designed on the GETS platform. We investigated what their 
strategic positions towards carbon markets were and how they werereflected into the 
prototypes design.We held 18 semi-structured interviews with these actors. We distinguish 
between three types of actors: (1) the leaders of the platform (The members of Eurelectric's 
working group on climate change and an expert from the international energy agency); (2) 
participants to the role play (representative of the electricity companies that participated, the 
representatives of industrial companies and financial institutions that participated); and (3) 
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external contributors (A member of the group on an emission trading scheme at the European 
Commission and other economists and experts in view at this moment).  
Among the organisers of the role play, we interviewed two members of Eurelectric: (1) 
thehead of Eurelectric’s working group on climate change, who, since he had been in charge 
of the dossier on the liberalisation of the electricity sector at UNIPEDE, had become “a 
devoted supporter of market instruments” (Scowcroft, 2012); and (2) a member of the 
working group, representing an electricity company, who had acquired special skills in 
modelling during his PhD. From the International Energy Agency, we interviewed a young 
economist specialised in emission trading, who was in charge of supervising the GETS 
simulation. From ParisBourse stock market, we interviewed a young trader interested in the 
developments surrounding environmental markets. Our questions were oriented into mainly 
five directions: their role in the platform, what they learnt during the GETS; what were the 
different possible alternatives for the carbon market design and how they selected them; We 
also asked about the position of the other platform members toward the design of the 
platform.  
Among the participants to the role play, we interviewed representatives of each sector 
involved – electricity, industry, financial –, in order to compare their strategic positions and 
expectations with regard to carbon markets and the evolution of these positions over the 
course of the experiments. We interviewed the head of climate policy at Electricité de 
France
1
. From the industry, we met the person that was in charge of sustainability issues at 
Lafarge
2
as well as two members of the paper industry. From the financial sector, we 
interviewed the former head of climate policy atNatSource, an asset management services 
provider for environmental markets. He was in charge of defending the financial sector’s 
participation in the EU-ETS as the sector’s participation in a European carbon market was 
                                                
1
Electricité de France is the French leader in the electricity sector 
2
Lafarge is the French leader in the cement sector 
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controversial. We asked them if they had made propositions to the design of the carbon 
market prototype, what they learnt during the role play, and what were the crucial elements 
that made them prefer one specific design better than another. 
As regards the main stakeholders who were not directly involved in the experiments, we 
interviewed a member of the team in charge of the Eu-ETS Dossier at the European 
Commission, to understand the nature of the relations between the EC and the electricity 
sector. We also interviewed two carbon economists and one member of the French industrial 
think tankon sustainable development “Entreprises Pour l’Environnement” (EPE), who 
enriched our understanding of the events that led from Kyoto to the enactment of the EU-
ETS. These actors are well known for the role they played during the institutionalization 
phase of the Eu-ETS and we wanted their opinion on the role that GETS played during the 
process. 
Data analysis 
We analyzed our data in three steps. First, we used both the written archives and the 
interviewees to build a narrative of the GETS episode and anchor it into its global institutional 
context (Langley, 1999). This first contact with the data gave us insights into the controversial 
issues that were debated, allowed us to identify key events and provided background 
knowledge about both the experiment and its institutional context. The chronology we 
produced at this first step is represented on figure 1 below. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Second, we conducted and open coding on the data, tracing evidences of bricolage. For the 
coding, we used only the written archives of the GETS simulation that would provide a more 
neutral source and less corrupted by time than the interviewees. Indeed, we feared that the 
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people we interviewed had rationalized their story too much as we interviewed them ten years 
after the facts. To trace instances of bricolage, our open coding was organized toward the 
three elementary activities of bricolage: crafting, trial and evaluation. The coding provided 
considerable codes. A typical instance of trial would be the following: “Faced with these 
goals and constraints each VC was able to determine its own objectives and the strategy to 
reach them, but had to adjust this initial strategy in line with changes in parameters such as 
prices of raw materials and fuels, and in the electricity and CO2 markets”(GETS 2 report, 
p17).  
Third, we recoded the data gathered by the previous open coding to analyze the role played 
by the platform configuration in the bricolage. We regrouped the first order codes into more 
abstract second-order themes based on identifying common features using iterations of data 
examination and emerging theoretical insights (Corbin and Strauss, 2008); subsequent 
iterations resulted in three third-order themes. For instance, the following first order code 
“these individuals did not participate on behalf of their companies, but via so-called virtual 
companies, which did not necessarily bear any resemblance with their parent company.” 
(GETS 2 Report, p14) was classified under the second order code distancing, and further 
classified into the third order code abstraction effort as it unfolds in figure 2 below.   
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
We eventually obtained three categories of roles played by platforms in processes of 
institutional bricolage: catalyzing combinations, learning management and mediating between 
the bricoleurs.  
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Secret bricolage on the GETS platform 
This section provides a chronological narrative of the two cycles of bricolage that 
occurred on the GETS platform. 
Cycle 1: The GETS platform was launched in 1999 by EURELECTRIC (The European 
association for electricity companies). EURELECTRIC created a steering committee for the 
GETS platform that gathered scholars in economy, applied economists, actors form the 
French stock exchange and utilities.  
Crafting a carbon market prototype. The Steering Committee collectively crafted a set of 
rules to organize carbon exchanges. A simple example of rule is the one that sets the value of 
a carbon quota to 1 tone.  
Trial of the carbon market prototype. The steering Committee invited the utilities to perform a 
role play using the prototype. Participants created a virtual profile and engaged in trading on 
the exchange device provided by the French stock exchange in order to reach their carbon 
constraint.  
Evaluation of the prototype. Following the role play, the sector was convinced that markets 
instruments were more advantageous for them than taxes, originally preferred by the 
Commission. The objective was to convince the rest of the industry, that was still hostile to 
carbon markets.  
Cycle 2: The GETS steering Committee invited all the industry members to join the GETS 
platform, as well as the economists in charge of the dossier at the European Commission.  
Crafting three alternative prototypes. The members of the industry were invited to re-craft the 
prototype that had been elaborated previously. The collective re-crafting led to three different 
prototypes.  
Trial of the three prototypes. In order to test the three alternative prototypes, three role plays 
were performed.  
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Evaluation of the alternative prototypes. The members of the steering Committee (organizers 
and guests) converged on one alternative that was favorable regarding all the different criteria 
of the stakeholders.   
Findings 
Catalyzing combinations 
Mediating between knowledge from divers statuses 
Our coding revealed that the prototype associates very heterogeneous bodies of knowledge 
that don’t share the same status: theoretical, profane, managerial. For instance, the first 
prototype integrates in its design economic theory, managerial knowledge on the functioning 
of stock exchanges and profane knowledge on abatement costs.  
Mediating between actor’s expectations 
The different tools, rules and devices that are integrated to the design of the carbon markets 
prototypes reveal the expectations of the bricoleurs. For instance, the addition of project 
mechanisms is typically representative of the expectations of the industrial sectors that seek to 
achieve low cost emissions. To the contrary, the rule that limit the flux of permits from 
project mechanisms were proposed by economists from the European commission.  
learningmanagement 
The trial of the different carbon market prototypes was not organized directly in the real 
world but inside the GETS platform. Before the trials, considerable effort was made to create 
appropriate conditions for the simulation. This effort is perceptible through the multiplication 
of equipment, management tools and models designed and set up to support the simulation.  
The coding revealed that the experimental settingis in tension between two requirements: 
on the one hand, the experimental setting should be realistic enough to ensure serious 
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participation by companies’, as well as the transposition of the results in the real world.On the 
other hand, the experimental setting should be abstract enough to enable actors to take 
distance from theirshort term interests to enable exploration. The organizers of the simulation 
(Eurelectric, the International Energy Agency and PricewaterhouseCoopers) made 
considerable efforts to set up experimental conditions that filled perfectequilibrium 
betweenrealism and abstraction. 
Realism effort on the platform 
The effort to set up experimental conditions that are realistic enough is identifiable through 
the details of the organization of the simulation. By details we understand the models, 
equipments and actors gathered. These organizational details fall into three categories: the 
ones that mimic real conditions; the ones that create equivalences with real conditions, and the 
ones that legitimate the societal importance of the trial.  
Mimicking real conditions. To mimic real conditions, the organizers of the trial decided to 
borrow a real trading platform to perform the simulation. Euronext – the former French stock 
exchange – lent its trading platform during the empty hours to the organizers. The organizer 
also mandated a consulting company in charge of creating models and tools that reproduce 
real conditions. For example, a sophisticated model coupled with an algorithm was created to 
simulate the evolution of raw material prices and randomly introduce price anomalies such as 
the ones real actors face in day to day operations. In the second simulation, financial 
institutions were invited to participate to the simulation as they would probably be an 
important actor of the forthcoming carbon market.  
Creating equivalences. The creation of equivalences was used when models and tools were 
insufficient to reproduce real conditions. For example, the time scale of the simulation and the 
time scale of a real market were made comparable by creating a transposition table. As a 
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result, each simulation was spread over 4 or 5 sessions […] with each year simulated over one 
hour. 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Linking with recognize institutions. The societal importance of the simulation was made 
visible through the institutional network it had developed. The main institutional stakeholders 
involved in the making of the European Carbon market, in particular the European 
Commission (policy makers, NGO’s, financial brokers) were invited to take part to the trial as 
observers. In terms of participants, the organizers of the second trial made sure that all the 
potential actors of a carbon market were represented.  
“The simulation included companies from all the sectors discussed in the Green 
Paper […] issued by the European Commission in March 2000.”(GETS2 :12) 
The prototype was coupled with other existing institutional mechanisms such as the Carbon 
Development Mechanism institutionalized as one of the three flexibility mechanisms of the 
Kyoto protocol in 1997.  
Furthermore, the mission assigned to the players during the simulation was both to reach 
societal electricity demand, and maximize their revenues while complying with the carbon 
target. 
Abstraction effort on the platform  
Another effort undertaken by the organizers of the simulation, that may sound antagonistic 
with the previous one, is the effort to set up abstract (rather “unrealistic”) experimental 
conditions. Such effort is recognizable to the impressive accumulation of tools, devices and 
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organizational fdetailsthat are put in place. The coding revealed three categories of abstraction 
efforts: distancing; theorizing; purifying.  
Distancing. Distancing refers to the effort undertaken to invite actors (organizers, players) to 
take distance from their usual positions and interests. An instance of distancing may be found 
in the anonymizing of the simulation. The companies that participated to the testing didn’t 
trade on their real names; they first endorsed virtual identity under which they could play and 
develop strategies anonymously.  
“Companies were free to choose any profile they wished for their virtual 
companies.”(Gets 1 report, p4) 
The setting of a virtual profile goes as follows: the company has to choose an energy mix. 
Figure 4 shows de virtual profile chosen by one of the companies renamed virtual company 1.  
Once the profile is chosen, the virtual company has to calculate its yearly emissions and then 
comply with the overall emission reduction objective set up by the organizers of the role play. 
Distance on the results of the trial was also provided by the steering Committee. The steering 
Committee systematically reminded the players that the price levels observed as well as the 
results in terms of supply and demand (so to say the usual causes of disagreement between 
actors)were unlikely to prejudge reality.  
“[…] in a real-world emission trading system under the Kyoto Protocol, would 
probably deliver different results in terms of supply and demand, price levels, and 
production strategies.” (Gets 1 report, p32) 
 
Theorizing. Considerable effort was been made to re-create the theoretical hypothesis under 
which cap and trade markets function perfectly. Neo-classical conditions for perfect market 
were reproduced (atomicity, symmetry of information, fair access to the market). Atomicity 
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was provided by increasing the number of players from the first to the second simulation; 
Measures were taken to ensure the symmetry of information such as the setting of an artificial 
institution dedicated to information reporting and sharing. Fair access to the market was 
provided by setting a trading platform where exchanges could be operated free of charge. 
“The Gets 2 simulation managed an organised market listing of electricity and 
CO2 emissions permits contracts. By organised market, we have to understand: a 
centralised market offering a fair access to the market, a competitive book order, 
and the broadcasting of information which enable liquidity and price reference 
set up.” (Gets 2 report, p17) 
For instance, for cap and trade markets to work well, Ronald Coase (the father of cap and 
trade markets) identified that there should not be transaction costs. In order to limit 
transaction costs, all transactions took place on the exchange.   
Simplifyingrefers to the fact that real objects are too complex to support experiments. To 
become manageable, real objects first need to be simplified. Approximations were made for 
instance on electricity transported that was assumed to be free of cost. To reduce complexity, 
schematizations were made: two types of players only were defined (energy consumers and 
energy producers) and two types of markets only were in interaction (electricity and carbon). 
Of course, such simplifications would not stand in the real world, but they did do the job for 
the simulation. 
“Overall, these minor limitations did not hinder the simulation, and in fact helped 
to keep it readily understandable by all participants, thereby allowing the 
members to design sophisticated strategies and environmental optimisation 
schemes.” (Gets2 report, p13) 
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Fostering compromise between the bricoleurs’ interests 
The coding revealed that four criteria were at play during the GETS to evaluate carbon 
markets prototypes: an economic criterion, a managerial criterion, an environmental criterion 
and technical criterion. To show the role of these criteria in the evaluation, we’ll describe their 
impact on the appreciation of two features of the prototypes: the gateway system (that was 
introduced in the second bricolage episode) and the banking rule (unchanged in the two 
bricolage episodes). The gateway system is a system borrowed to the UK government that 
combines in the same carbon market absolute emission targets and relative emission targets. 
The banking rule enables a company to keep quotas in reserve from a commitment period to 
the other. According to this rule, a company that has reduced its emissions more than its 
targethas the optionto keep its excess of quotas and use it the following period instead of 
selling them directly on the market.  
The economic criteria. 
The economic criterion consists in assessing the prototypes' features according to their 
effects on the market performance (liquidity, quick delivery of the price of carbon, stability of 
the price of carbon).  
For instance, the banking rule had a positive impact on the economic performance of the 
prototypes, in particular because it hampered the “wall effect”. Indeed, a “wall effect” had 
consistently appeared at the end of all three simulations. It consistedin the apparition of 
irrational behaviors, abnormal transactions, patterns and prices on the market at the end of 
each commitment periods. When companies do not have long termtargets, they are not 
encouraged to develop long term coherent strategies on the carbon market and will prefer 
short term optimizations to maximize their revenues. Such situations would lead virtual 
companies to sell all exceeding allowances instead of banking them, and restrain long term 
investment in clean technologies. The introduction of banking had positive outcomes on the 
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wall effect as it artificially extends the horizon of the commitment. It is also compatible with 
hedging strategies that are used by electricity companies to minimize risk. Today, this 
argument is still very alive in international climate debates when new reduction emission 
targets are to be set up.  
To the contrary, the gateway system had a negative assessment on the economic criteria. 
To work, the gateway mechanismrelies on sophisticated monitoring system that results in high 
transaction costs. Yet, economic theory suggests that market instruments are efficient under a 
no transaction costs hypothesis (Coase, 1960).    
"It is not certain that such a system can be implemented in all industrial sectors and it 
does generate monitoring costs that are far superior to those required in a standard 
system." Doc2 P7. 
The environmentalcriteria. 
The environmental criterion consists in assessing the features of the carbon market 
prototype according to their "environmental integrity." In other words,to be approved, design 
features should not interfere with the achievement of overall emissions objective.  
For instance, banking emissions from a period to the other does not jeopardize the overall 
environmental target. It only re-allocates the company target over the time-period of the 
constraint. The overall environmental integrity of emission trading was assessed and 
legitimized by the fact that trading is not sufficient to achieve the overall emission cap. 
Technology investment and production management are required to achieve the overall target.  
"Banking and grace periods would also assist compliance strategies, without a negative 
impact on the environment." (GETS1 Report : 12)    
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To the contrary, intensity targets, that are used the gate way system, do not guaranty that 
the overall environmental objective is achieved. Intensity targets cap emissions according to 
production units. Such targets guaranty that companies revise their production models, not 
that they emit less. For instance, if a company emits twice less but produces thrice more, then 
the environmental integrity of the system is not achieved. Gateways typically can do nothing 
against this problem and furthermore, they make it difficult to controlexactly the levels of 
emission reductions achieved.  
The managerial criteria. 
The managerial criterion refers to the effect of a design feature of a carbon market 
prototype on strategy building inside companies. The managerial performance of banking was 
judged positive whereas the managerial performance of the gateway was judged negative.  
Banking provided companies with flexibility and proved to favor investments in clean 
technologies in sectors where investmentcould have been less interesting than trading from an 
economic point of view. Indeed, investment in clean technologies results in surplus carbon 
credits for the company. According to the carbon price delivered by the market, it may 
become less interesting for a company to invest in clean technologies than, to by credits from 
another entity.Banking makes it possible to sell credits at the best carbon price on the 
following periods.  
"Virtual companies relied a lot on the possibility to bank emission permits generated in 
the first budget period, either to comply in the next period, or to sell for revenues, when 
market prices were favorable. In a sector like the power sector, the size of investment in 
new production is largely dependent on the chosen technology: investing in a new 300 
MW combined-cycle gas turbine may deliver more low-emission generation than what 
the company needs to comply with its CO2 objective. Banking made it possible to 
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benefit from these additional reductions, on top of the possibility to trade them 
immediately." (GETS1 report : P25) 
To the contrary, the gateway introduced a high level of managerial complexity that was 
difficult to handle for virtual companies.The gateway made it difficult to obtain transparent 
information and global representationof the market. The companies feared that it could 
hamper the making of strategic decisions if implemented for real.  
“The implementation of a system combining an absolute (capped) sector and a sector 
with index-based objectives was technically feasible but complex to interpret for the 
participants.” (GETS2 Report: 7) 
The overall performance of carbon markets, received positive evaluation from managerial 
criteria. Indeed, an emission trading scheme, when coupled with the recently liberalized 
electricity market, provided options for strategic optimization between carbon trading, 
electricity trading and clean technologies investments.   
“The use of a dual electricity and carbon market allowed industrial companies to optimise 
the  economic  cost  of  reductions  in  greenhouse  gas  emissions.  For  each  of  the  three 
commitment periods within the three simulations,  the  industrial companies as a whole met 
their reduction objectives.” (GETS2 report : 7) 
The technical criteria. 
The technical performance of the gateway was judged negative.  
“The management of the gateway has proved extremely complex in terms of monitoring. 
It should also be noted that gateway's management constraints were a lot more simple 
in the simulation than they might have been in a real market. Market conditions did not 
led the SO to close the gateway. Other conclusions are difficult to draw, because the 
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compliance with index-based targets without creating extra permits depends on the 
evolution of the macro-economic conditions.” (GETS2 report: 28) 
Discussion 
On institutional Theory  
Catalyzing. 
Platforms act as bricolage catalyzers as they confine into the same space actors from 
heterogeneous domains that come to share their repertoires. The platform artificially 
structures relations among actors that do not share the same knowledge, belief system and 
interests as regards the making of carbon markets. These actors are encouraged to hybridize 
their representations without any prejudice on the value of their propositions. As seen in the 
dedicated section, different bodies of knowledge are hybridized independently of their status. 
Profane knowledge and theoretical knowledge are fit together without any presupposed 
hierarchy between them. The platform abolishes taken for granted orders of merit. All the 
resources are brought about into a flat world within which bricoleurs are free to mobilize 
them without referring to any institutionalized knowledge on what resource should be 
associated together. This characteristic of the platform stimulates the variety of unexpected 
and even provocative combinations.  
Learning. 
Platforms play an important role during processes of institutional bricolage in the way that 
they enable learning. Indeed, the nature of the experimental setting is explicitly meant to 
provoke reality and to be the closest as possible to real conditions. Different artifacts are 
created in order to mimic reality such as the random introduction of "accidents" in primary 
energy prices and realistic models of energy demand. Equivalences were created to ensure 
consistency between the conditions of the simulation and reality. Such effort of organizing the 
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experimental conditions enable to learn things that still have value of truth outside the 
experimental configuration. To the contrary, an important effort is made to operate a distance 
between the experimental setting of the platform and real conditions. In the GETS, players are 
"masked". The mask provokes an epistemological switch in their collective dialogue. They 
are not defending the position of their organization; they are participating to a collective 
enquiry. Thus, the mask enables a temporary switch in the player's strategies: from individual 
strategies to a collective strategy. In the space of the platform, the players are facing the same 
uncertainties about both the nature of the object that is being designed - the output of 
bricolage -, its potential effects as well as the value propositions associated to it. Thus, they 
must collectively build the means to learn about what has to be learnt.  
Compromising. 
The platform promotes the making of shared understandings though a discussion of the 
results of the trial. Theoretically, infinity of possible combinations is imaginable to form a 
carbon market prototype. Every time a prototype does not fill all the criteria displayed by the 
community of bricoleurs, it is rejected, knowing that the variety of prototypes is not a limiting 
factor. Thus, in bricolage processes the production of shared understandings is the result of an 
intellectual operation that theorizes the characteristics of the prototype. It doesn’t precede the 
materialization of the innovative concept but rather follows it.  
Each criterion was defended by at least one actor of the platform. Schematically, the 
Economists taking part to the platform were keener to evaluate the performance of the market 
in economic terms, the European Commission, more on environmental terms, the industrial 
companies represented would advance a managerial criterion and the consulting company 
defended a rather technical point of view. Nevertheless, all the actors of the platform 
progressively familiarized with the criteria of one another. When a feature of the design meets 
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all criteria, it is commonly approved. Interestingly, the prototypes were evaluated both on a 
modular basis (feature by feature) and on a global basis (global performance). 
On bricolage 
In the organizational literature, bricolage is commonly perceived as a particular way in 
which actors engage in the production of novelty. Consequently, bricolage may be 
conceptualized as a design activity: an activity that produces innovative objects, technologies, 
practices or organizational forms. Nevertheless, the paper shows that bricolage differs from 
traditional design activities as its performance is not measurable by traditional innovation 
assessment criteria. To the contrary, the performance of bricolage is best captured by its 
ability to foster compromise between a community of designers.  
Furthermore, the case study reveals an important aspect of bricolage that has remained 
unexplored: its experimental dimension. Inside platforms, the bricoleurs rely on sophisticated 
experimental conditions that are central in enhancing the prototypes and promoting 
constructive discussions among the bricoleurs. Experimentation is a form of trial that involves 
a higher degree of reflexivity than commonly described trials.  
On platforms 
In the context of economics performativity, the nature of the activities that are undertaken 
on platforms and lead to compromising are unknown. The paper expands the understanding 
on platforms by exploring the bricolage activities they host and provoke.  
Conclusion 
We have studied two episodes of institutional bricolage on carbon markets prototypes 
inside the GETS platform. Our contributions are three-fold. First, in the context of 
institutional theory, we show that platforms stimulate institutional bricolage in three ways: 
they catalyze the production of provoking combinations, they protect bricoleurs from 
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institutional pressures and promote compromising on shared understandings. The platform 
configuration acts as an agency accelerator. Second, we expand the understanding of 
bricolage in organizations by suggesting that it belongs to an original class of design activities 
that value lies in compromise rather than in the originality and robustness the innovations 
produced. Eventually, we contribute to the literature on the performativity of economics by 
describing empirically the platform configuration. From a managerial perspective, the paper 
gives insights on unknown mechanisms of policymaking. The understanding of platforms and 
their characteristics has potential to enhance the making of new regulations.  
Furthermore, our paper suggests that "experimental moments" play an important role 
during processes of institutional bricolage. Indeed, institutionalization processes not only 
consist in promoting strategically an innovation that has been previously identified and 
theorized, such as in the model of the institutional entrepreneur (Battilana et al., 2009). It 
consists in exploring new options, new possible orders for collective action. Our paper shows 
how different possible orders are collectively imagined and experienced in platforms. It seems 
that collective learning is crucial to inform processes of institutional innovation. Traditionally, 
collective inquiry, the form of learning it conveys, is a dimension of institutional processes 
that is not explored. It is different from theorization (Greenwood et al., 2002; Strang and 
Meyer, 1993) as theorization may happen only as an ex-post rationalization of innovation (to 
highlight its strengths compared to previous situation). It seems that experimentation, that is 
inherent to bricolage may play an important role during processes of institutional innovation 
as originator of agency. Our findings suggest that experimentation stimulates the degree of 
agency involved in selection mechanisms. The role of experimentation as an originator of 
agency may be an interesting track to follow for the understanding of institutional innovation 
processes.  
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Tables and Figures 
Figure1. Chronology of the GETS platform 
Episode Activity Year GETS platform European 
Commission 
Episode 1 Crafting December 
1998 
Design of the GETS device 
by Eurelectric working 
group on CC 
 
Testing March 1999 Simulation 1  
Evaluating October 
1999 
GETS 1 Report   
Episode 2 Crafting  Revising the GETS device  
Testing February 
2000 
April 2000 
June 2000 
Simulation 2.1 
Simulation 2.2 
Simulation 2.3 
 
Evaluating November 
2000 
- GETS 2 Report 
- Presentation of the results 
at the Bonn climate CoP 
 
Episode 3 Crafting 2001 Stakeholder consultation organized by the European 
Commission 
2003  Adoption of the 
directive 2003/87/EC 
establishing a 
European emission 
trading system 
Testing January 
2005 
 Launch of the Eu-ETS 
Evaluating 2007  First evaluation and 
revision of the Eu-ETS 
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Figure 2. Coding structure for learning management in the platform 
 
 
 
  
Learning management
ANONYMIZING. these individuals did not participate on behalf of their 
companies, but via so‐called virtual companies, which did not 
necessarily bear any resemblance with their parent company. (DOC2P14)
ABSTRACTION
EFFORT
Distancing
LIMITING TRANSACTION COSTS. VCs were able to freely exchange their 
permits on the market (Doc2P14).
Legitimating societal
importance
REALISM EFFORT
REPRODUCING THEORY. Centralised market offering a fair access to the 
market, a competitive book order, and the broadcasting of information 
which enable liquidity and price reference set up (Doc2 P17)
USING REAL EQUIPMENT. The auction was organised using Euronext's
market tool (Doc2P19)
Mimicking real conditions
SIMULATING REAL ECONOMY. In Gets2, PwC set up a system governing 
annual changes in prices of primary energy and raw materials 
(Doc2P11). 
INVITING INSTITUTIONAL ACTORS. the simulation included companies from 
all the sectors discussed in the Green Paper […] issued by the European 
Commission in March 2000. Doc2P12
COUPLING WITH INSTITUTIONALIZED MECHANISMS. In Gets2, we designed two 
systems […] to include clean development mechanism (CDM) & demand 
side management (DSM) projects (Doc2P12)
Creating equivalences
ASSIGNING SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL MISSIONS. (DOC2P15)
Their mission in the simulation was as follows: Meet […] their domestic 
demand; Maximise their revenues
ANALOGIES. Each simulation was spread over 4 or 5 sessions […] with 
each year simulated over one hour. (Doc2 P25)
INTRODUCING UNCERTAINTY. It was also agreed that “accidents” would be 
introduced randomly in the course of the game (Doc1 P6).
Purification
SIMPLIFYING REALITY. For the sake of simplicity, fuel prices were assumed 
to remain constant throughout the simulation. (Doc1 P12)
SCHEMATIZATION. There are two markets (electricity and CO2) and two 
types of participants (electricity companies and energy consumers) 
Doc2P10
Transposing theory
35 
 
Figure 3 Equivalences between real time and platform time 
 
 
Figure 4: Anonymizing companies 
 
 
